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Will the Birds Stay South?
The Rise of Class Actions and Other Forms
of Group Litigation Across Latin America
Manuel A. G6mez*
I. INTRODUCTION
The filing of claims by foreign plaintiffs in United States
courts has been reported to be on the rise.' The general perception
is that foreign claimants have strong incentives to litigate in the
United States,2 and Latin Americans are not the exception.3 Sev-
eral reasons have been given to explain the rising numbers of for-
eign claimants in United States courts, including the possibility of
* Associate Professor, Florida International University College of Law. The
author wishes to thank Deborah R. Hensler, Christopher Hodges, and his other
colleagues at the interdisciplinary research network on global class actions, and
participants in the International Conferences on Global Class Actions held at Oxford
in 2007 and 2008, and Miami in 2010, for their comments on earlier drafts of this
article. He would also like to thank Masayuki Murayama, Luigi Comminelli, Bert
Kritzer and other participants at the 2010 Workshop on Dispute Resolution from a
Comparative Perspective held at the International Institute for the Sociology of Law
in Ofiati, Spain. Diana Rodriguez Franco and Beatriz Londofio Toro offered
invaluable insight and sources on Colombia. Silvia Kim, Diego Gandolfo, Rosangela
Delgado and Vitor Lorengo Simao Castro helped the author learn more about class
actions in Brazil. Eugenio Cardenas and Julio Gutierrez Morales helped locate
materials on the status of collective litigation in Mexico, and Agustin Barroilhet
helped with class actions in Chile. Marisol Floren-Romero offered excellent library
support, and FIU College of Law provided financial assistance throughout. This
article builds upon previous work published as Manuel A. G6mez, Collective Redress
in Latin America: The regulation of class actions and other forms of aggregate and
group litigation for the protection of consumer rights, in L'Art. 140 Bis del Codice del
Consumo L'Azione di Classe 265-82(Lorenzo Mezzasoma & Francesco Rizzo, eds.
2011).
1. See Wolfgang Wurmnest, Foreign Private Plaintiffs, Global Conspiracies, and
the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law, 28 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 205, 206 (2004-2005).
2. See, e.g., Manuel A. Gomez, Like Migratory Birds: Latin American Claimants
in U.S. Courts and the Ford-Firestone Rollover Litigation, 11 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM.
281, 295-97 (2005) (discussing the incentives perceived by South American plaintiffs
for litigating in U.S. courts); Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1982] 1 W.L.R.
730, 733 (C.A. 1983) ("As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the
United States."); David W. Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in
Transnational Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit
Injunctions, 68 TEX. L. REV. 937, 938 (1989-1990) ("Personal injury victims are
virtually always better off suing in the United States.
3. See supra note 2.
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obtaining larger awards that contain punitive damages.4 Foreign
claimants also seem to be attracted by the cost rules prevailing in
the United States, under which each party bears its own costs,'
thus minimizing the risks of the party that loses the litigation.6 A
related enticement for foreign parties to pursue their claims in
United States courts rests on the possibility of retaining counsel
on a contingency fee basis, common in the United States but gen-
erally proscribed elsewhere.'
Another perceived advantage of the United States vis-A-vis
most Latin American jurisdictions rests on the availability of class
actions and similar procedural devices.' Class actions facilitate
the aggregation of numerous small claims against one or several
defendants in a single litigation, an outcome that will bind-and
thus benefit-not only representative plaintiffs but all class mem-
bers.9 Because many Latin American countries do not allow class
actions, citizens of those countries have long relied on pursuing
their claims in United States courts, often to obtain redress for
harms suffered in their own countries. 0
Some have criticized the ostensible openness of American
courts to foreign plaintiffs by arguing that the increased presence
of cases involving foreign parties with no significant connection to
the United States congests the American judiciary, uses up valua-
ble resources, and encourages forum shopping." Conversely, some
Latin American jurisdictions have reacted by enacting blocking
4. Cf. Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial is Our Need for a Judgments-
Recognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It? 24 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 167, 182-83 (1998); Ilana T. Buschkin, The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits
in a Globalized Economy-Permitting Foreign Claimants to be Members of Class
Action Lawsuits in the U.S. Federal Courts, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1563, 1597 (2005).
5. David Boyce, Foreign Plaintiffs and Forum Non Conveniens: Going Beyond
Reyno, 64 TEX. L. REV 193, 197 (1985); Donna Solen, Forum Non Conveniens and the
International Plaintiff, 9 Fla. J. Int'l L. 343, 343 (1994).
6. See Thomas D. Rowe Jr., The Legal Theory ofAttorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DuKE L.J. 651, 651 (1982).
7. See Sheila Birnbaum & Douglas W. Dunham, Foreign Plaintiffs and Forum
Non Conveniens, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 241, 242 (1990); G6mez, supra note 2, at 283;
Hebert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice
in the United States, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 267 (1998); Mathias Reimann, Liability
for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a
Worldwide Standard? 51 Am. J. COMP. L. 751, 822 (2003).
8. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 (1981); Birnbaum &
Dunham, supra note 7, at 243.
9. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
10. See Gomez, supra note 2, at 283.
11. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 998 (2d Cir. 1975);
Buschkin, supra note 4, at 1568 n. 25; F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran S.A., 542
U.S. 155, 167-68 (2004) (citation omitted).
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statutes in an attempt to discourage their own citizens from con-
veniently choosing to litigate in the United States, instead of
using their local courts.12
This debate has encouraged different stakeholders, including
scholars,1 3 policymakers, consumer protection advocates, plaintiff
lawyers, and defense lawyers, 4 to discuss the possibility of adopt-
ing class actions and other forms of group litigation throughout
Latin America. At the same time, Latin American judges are
receiving requests for judicial protection against collective harms
through mechanisms not originally intended for dealing with
mass claims," and with the aid of practitioners they have devised
creative solutions to remedy situations not previously regulated
by statutes.16
12. See M. Ryan Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang Litigation: How
Convenient is Forum Non Conveniens in Transnational Litigation? 4 BYU INT'L L. &
MNGMT. REV. 21, 21 n. 2 (2007); Ley No. 364, 5 October 2000, Ley Especial para la
Tramitaci6n de Juicios Promovidos por las Personas Afectadas por el Uso de
Pesticidas Fabricados a Base de DBCP [Special Law for the Conduct of Lawsuits filed
by persons affected by the use of pesticides manufactured with a DBCP base] LA
GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.] 17 January 2001 (Nicar.); see generally Henry Saint
Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and Blocking Statutes, 35 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 21, 22 (2003).
13. See generally Hector A. Mairal, Argentina, in 622 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 54 (2009); see generally Ada Pellegrini Grinover, Brazil, in 622 ANNALS Am.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 63 (2009); see generally Martin Gubbins & Carla Lopez, Chile,
in 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 68 (2009); see generally Angel R. Oquendo,
Upping the Ante: Collective Litigation in Latin America, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
248 (2009).
14. See Mark A. Behrens, Gregory L. Fowler & Silvia Kim, Global Litigation
Trends, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 166, 172-81 (2008-2009); Luiz Migliora et al., Trial
and Error: Class Actions in Brazil and the US, and Global Trends, LATIN LAWYER,
Sept. 2007, at 38, 39.
15. See Angel R. Oquendo, supra note 13, at 259 ("For instance, some tribunals R
south of the border have created, sua sponte and in the absence of any enabling
legislation, a joint writ of protection.").
16. One example can be found in the now famous ruling T-025 of 2004 by the
Colombian Constitutional Court, which ordered the aggregation of 109 individual
actions and created a system for dealing with the status of many families displaced as
a result of the guerrilla wars in that country. The Court established that several
fundamental rights had been violated and took unprecedented action to remedy this.
See Corte Constitucional [CC] [Constitutional Court], febrero 6, 2004, Sentencia T-
025/04 (Colom.). For an in-depth analysis of decision T-025 and its policy implications,
see CESAR RODRIGUEZ GARAVITO & DIANA RODRIGUEZ FRANCO, CORTES Y CAMBIO
SOCIAL: COMO LA CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL TRANSFORMO DESPLAZAMIENTO FORZADO EN
COLOMBIA, Centro de Estudios de Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad, Dejusticia (2010),
available at http://www.rtfn-watch.org/uploads/media/Colombia_-_Cortes-y cambio
social.pdf (2010); OSCAR DUERAS, DESPLAZAMIENTO INTERNO FORZA D O: UN ESTADO DE
CosAs INCONSTITUCIONAL QUE SE AGUDIZA: EFFECTOS DE LA SENTENCIA T-024 DE 2004
DE LA CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL (Universidad del Rosario 2009); ANGEL R. OQUENDO,
LATIN AMERICAN LAW 242-58 (Foundation Press 1st ed. 2006).
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A small but forceful group of countries" have gone further by
adopting legislation that enables class actions and other forms of
aggregate litigation. The new laws vary greatly by country, rang-
ing from the inclusion of a few provisions in a given statute" to
the comprehensive overhaul of several lawsl9 or the passage of
constitutional amendments that exalt the importance of advanc-
ing the collective protection of individual rights.20
This article explores the context in which the regulation of
class actions is emerging in Latin America. To that end, this arti-
cle describes the different forms of aggregate and group litigation
that exist in that region, from the mechanisms traditionally
included in the different codes of civil procedure and other legisla-
tion to the recently enacted vehicles for the protection of individ-
ual and collective rights.
Further, this article focuses on the differences and similari-
ties in procedural rules and legal practices regarding the use of
remedies against collective harms. This paper also explores the
different incentives and obstacles created by the new statutes and
delves into the question of how these laws might affect the devel-
opment of collective litigation in the region.
The article is divided into four sections. Following this intro-
duction, Section II offers an overview of the regulatory context of
collective redress in Latin America. Section III focuses on the five
jurisdictions that have enacted statutes regulating class actions
and other forms of aggregate litigation and briefly describes some
of the challenges faced by these newly enacted procedural vehi-
cles. The conclusion is presented as Section IV.
A cautionary note regarding Latin America is in order. By
treating the region as a unit, one runs the risk of oversimplifying
a very complex reality that encompasses twenty different coun-
tries, each with its own official legal system, political institutions,
and distinctive social and economic reality.2 1 Despite the fact that
they belong to the same legal tradition and share similar legal
institutions,22 no one could say, for example, that Venezuela and
17. As I will explain in Section III infra, these are Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, and Mexico.
18. See infra Section III, Chile.
19. See infra Section III, Mexico.
20. See infra Section III, Colombia and Brazil.
21. See Rogelio P6rez-Perdomo, Notes of a Social History of Latin American Law:
The Relationship between Legal Practices and Principles, 52 REV. COL. AB. 1, 1 (P.R.
1991); see OQUENDO, LATIN AMERICAN LAw, supra note 16, at 3.
22. See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL
484
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Chile are the same, or that Guatemala and Paraguay could or
should be treated equally.
Latin American countries also embody different social, eco-
nomic and political realities that obviously affect how the law
operates.2 3 The Argentine financial crisis of the late nineties,
which prompted the filing of more than one hundred thousand
writs of protection,24 and the Colombian humanitarian crisis of the
early 2000s, which gave rise to hundreds of claims filed on behalf
of tens of thousands of displaced people in different courts
throughout the country,"2 are just two examples of external factors
that have prompted the legal machinery to react.
In both cases, the absence of specific legislation to deal with
mass harms prompted lawyers and judges to come up with differ-
ent ways to handle such an unprecedented number of claims in an
efficient manner. Legal actors also had to craft solutions by
maneuvering the law or by adapting its application to the specific
circumstances at hand.26 These phenomena have naturally shaped
how litigants strategize the use of legal tools in each country, and
it has also had an impact on the policy debate about the imple-
mentation of procedural vehicles such as class actions. One could
draw similar experiences from Brazil or Chile, for example, and
notice how the responses would be unique to each place.
Notwithstanding their contrasting realities, Latin American
jurisdictions also have many things in common. The first element
that comes to mind is their former status as colonies of Spain and
Portugal. In this regard, most Latin American countries not only
LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN
AMERICA 1 (Stanford University Press 3d ed. 2007).
23. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, Latin Legal Cultures
in the Age of Globalization, in LEGAL CULTURES IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: LATIN
AMERICA AND LATIN EUROPE 1, 1 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Rogelio Perez-Perdomo,
eds., Stanford University Press 2003).
24. Osvaldo Alfredo Gozaini, El derecho de amparo y la emergencia judicial
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Colegio Publico de Abogados de la Capital
Federal).
25. See generally CESAR RODRIGUEZ GARAVITO & DIANA RODRIGUEZ FRANCO,
CORTES Y CAMBIO SOCIAL: COMO LA CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL TRANSFORMO
DESPLAZAMIENTO FORZADO EN COLOMBIA: EFFECTOS DE LA SENTENCIA T-024 DE 2004 DE
LA CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL, Centro de Estudios de Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad,
Dejusticia (2010), available at http://www.rtfn-watch.org/uploads/media/Colombia -
Cortes-y-cambio-social.pdf (2010); OscAR DUENAS, DESPLAZAMIENTO INTERNO
FORZADO: UN ESTADO DE COSAS INCONSTITUCIONAL QUE SE AGUDIZA: EFFECTOS DE LA
SENTENCIA T-024 DE 2004 DE LA CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL (Universidad del Rosario
2009).
26. See GARAVITO & FRANCO, supra note 25, at 79.
27. See MATTHEW C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW
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share a common history, a set of cultural traits including-with
the notable exception of Brazil-language, but more importantly,
the same sources of official law.2 8
Even after the national independence processes that took
place during the eighteenth century, the then newly-formed
nations continued influencing each other's legal systems and have
since maintained a certain level of convergence with respect to key
legal institutions and practices.2 9 One example can be found in the
approach given to codification,30 and more recently, to the inclu-
sion of constitutional provisions referred to in third generation
rights.31 One feature more akin to the discussion on collective liti-
gation is the existence of remedies such as the constitutional writ
of protection known as amparo,32 tutela,3 3 or mandato de
seguranga,34 which has been traditionally relied upon to offer
redress against collective harms. 35 Another common trait of Latin
American jurisdictions is the ban on contingency-fee arrange-
ments, which is still prevalent in national legal systems through-
out the region, from Mexico to Argentina.3 6
Another shared feature of Latin American legal systems is
the prohibition of punitive or exemplary damage awards, and the
prevalence of the loser-pays (English) rule in civil litigation. 37 Fur-
ther, some of these aspects also help set Latin America apart from
the United States, where contingency-fee arrangements and puni-
tive damages not only exist but are widely accepted and have
played a key role in the development of aggregate litigation.
These common traits and the corresponding challenges that
come with them, coupled with the fact that the debate on the
AND INSTITUTIONS IN SPANISH AMERICA 12, 13 (University of Texas Press 2004); P6rez-
Perdomo, supra note 21, at 1.
28. See ANGEL OQUENDO, LATIN AMERICAN LAw, supra note 16, at vi-vii.
29. See FRIEDMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 23; JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN &
ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, Two Legal Traditions, in THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 2-3 (3d
ed. 2007).
30. See MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 22, at 27.
31. See Oquendo, supra note 13, at 254; see generally Andr6 Lapeyre, Franois de
Tinguy, & Karel Vasak, Les diffdrentes categories des droits de l'homme [The Different
Categories of the Rights of Man], in 1 LES DIMENSIONS UNIVERSELLES DES DROITs DE
L'HOMME 297 (1990) (BeIg.).
32. See, e.g., Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art.
107, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 30 de Diciembre de 1950 (Mex.); Art. 43,
CONSTITUCION NACION [CONST. NAC] (Arg.).
33. See CoNSTITUcIoN POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 86.
34. See CONSTITUQAo FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION], art. 5 (LXIX) (Braz.).
35. See Oquendo, supra note 13, at 262.
36. See Gomez, supra note 2, at 296.
37. Id. at 297.
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adoption of class actions has gained prominence in different juris-
dictions almost simultaneously, justify a common assessment of
the region with respect to group litigation. In addition, by looking
at different Latin American jurisdictions collectively, one can also
compare and contrast the different approaches to group litigation
and the legislative solutions given to common problems.
II. FROM THE TRADITIONAL DEFENSE OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF
COLLECTIVE INTERESTS: JOINDER AND THE
WRIT OF AMPARO
As is the case for most countries that follow the civil-law tra-
dition, Latin American procedural rules have historically focused
almost exclusively on non-aggregate, individual litigation. By way
of exception, specific provisions included in the different codes of
civil procedure," and more recently in several constitutions3 9 and
some special statutes,40 enable multiple parties to pursue their
claims or defenses within a single litigation.4 ' The two traditional
procedural vehicles that allow this are joinder and the writ of
amparo.
Joinder (litisconsorcio) rules allow the consolidation of parties
either because there are questions of law or fact common to those
acting as plaintiffs (litisconsorcio activo) or defendants (litiscon-
sorcio pasivo),4 2 because the action has arisen out of the same
transaction or series of transactions, or because the parties have
asserted right to relief or defense jointly.43 Depending on how
important the law deems the presence of certain litigants in the
proceedings, Latin American codes of civil procedure also contain
rules about permissive (litisconsorcio facultativo)4 4 and compul-
38. See, e.g., CODIGO PROCESAL CIVIL [COD. PROC. Civ.] [CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE], art. 82 (Peru); CODIGO PROCESAL CIVIL [COD. PROC. Civ.] [CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE], art. 582 (Parag.); Ada Pellegrini Grinover, Novas Tendkncias em materia
de legitimagao e coisa julgada nas agoes coletivas. Relatorio Geral-Civil Law, in
DIREITO PROCESSUAL COMPARADO, XIII WORLD CONGRESS OF PROCEDURAL LAw (Ada
Pellegrini Grinover & Petr?nio Calmon eds., 2007) (Braz.).
39. See Oquendo, supra note 13, at 262 n.38.
40. See EURICo FERRARESI, AQAo POPULAR, AQAo CIVIL PTBLICA E MANDADO DE
SEGURANQA COLETIVO: INSTRUMENTOS PROCESSUAIS COLETIVOs 68- 89 (2009) (Braz.).
41. See MIROW, supra note 27, at 180.
42. See generally MARIA ENCARNACION DAVILA MILLAN, LITIsCoNsoRCIo
NECESARIO: CONCEPTO Y TRATAMIENTO PROCESAL 1 (1992).
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO CIVIL [COD. PROC. Civ.] [CIVIL CODE OF
PROCEDURE], art. 107 (Costa Rica). This is similar to the "permissive joinder"
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sory joinder (litisconsorcio necesario).4 5
By enabling the consolidation of claims in the same litigation,
joinder promotes efficiency and ensures uniformity of outcomes
with respect to the parties;46 the claims are to be litigated before
the same judge whose decision rendered on the merits will have
res judicata effects with respect to all those involved and will pre-
clude the parties from raising the same claims in a separate suit.47
Also, because joinder is generally allowed in any civil case, there
are no limitations with respect to the type of remedies-injunctive
relief or monetary damages-sought by the parties, thus making
joinder a suitable solution in many cases. However, despite the
inexistence of a cap with regard to how many parties are permit-
ted to join in one action either as plaintiff or defendant, joinder is
usually impracticable in cases involving mass-damage claims.48
The writ of amparo (mandato de seguranga in Brazil4 9 or
acci6n de tutela in Colombia"o) is a procedural remedy originally
devised as a constitutional mechanism to protect citizens against
the actions or omissions of public or private entities that have
allegedly violated their fundamental rights."' Amparo52 initially
appeared in the 1841 Constitution of the Republic of Yucatdn53
(currently a province of Mexico). The Mexican Constitution of
1857 broadened the scope of this remedy against judicial acts that
allegedly violated individual constitutional rights.54 Further, the
established in Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIv. P.
20(a).
45. See, e.g., CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO CIVIL [COD. PROC. Civ.] [CIVIL CODE OF
PROCEDURE], art. 83 (Colom.).
46. Richard D. Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure
Federal Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1985).
47. See Alan N. Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IoWA L.
REV. 217, 217-18 (1953-1954); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action
Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 789 (2005).
48. Deborah R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview, in THE
ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 1, 16 (2009).
49. See CONsTITuilAo FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION], art. 5 (LXIX) (Braz.).
50. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.], art. 86.
51. See Hector Fix-Zamudio, El Amparo Mexicano como Instrumento Protector de
los Derechos Humanos, in ENSAYOS SOBRE EL DERECHO DE AMPARO 254 (1993) (Mex.);
Matthew C. Mirow, Marbury in Mexico: Judicial Review's Precocious Southern
Migration, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 41, 64 (2006).
52. Mirow, supra note 51, at 83.
53. See CONSTITUCION DE LA REPIlBLICA DE YUCATAN [Cons. Yucatan], de 1841
(Mex.).
54. See Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], de 1857
(Dublan, Manuel and Lozano, Jos6 Maria, Legislaci6n Mexicana o colecci6n completa
de las disposiciones legislativas expedidas desde la independencia de la Repiblica,
edici6n oficial, Mexico, 1877, tomo VIII pp. 384-399) (Mex.).
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1917 Mexican Federal Constitution expanded the writ of amparo
even more and shifted its focus from the protection of individual
rights to include rights of social or collective nature."
During the second half of the twentieth century, other Latin
American countries adopted the writ of amparo.6 This remedy
was generally regulated by way of constitutional provisions 7
geared to facilitate access to justice and to widen the protection of
individual and-during the most recent constitutional reform
movement-collective rights.
As Latin American constitutions shifted their interest to
advance the promotion of social solidarity and third-generation
rights59 and assigned the state a more active role in the protection
of the citizenry, amparo suits became increasingly popular.6 0
Moreover, the perceived judicial congestion and backlog of civil
courts throughout the region made the filing of amparo suits very
attractive.6 1
Amparo suits often involved the possibility of expedited pro-
55. See Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art. 107, de
1917 (Mex.); Matthew C. Mirow, Case Law in Mexico 1861 to 1919: The Work of
Ignacio Luis Vallarta, in 11 RATIO DECIDENDI 223, 227 (W. Hamilton Bryson & Serge
Dauchy, eds., 2006).
56. See generally PEDRO ABERASTURI ET AL., LA PROTECCION CONSTITUCIONAL DEL
CIUDADANO: ARGENTINA, BRASIL, CHSILE, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA Y VENEZUELA (Ciedla
1999); Allan Brewer-Carias, El Derecho de Amparo en Venezuela, in GARANTIAS
JURISDICCIONALES PARA LA DEFENSA DE LOs DERECHOs HUMANOS EN IBEROAMERICA
(1992).
57. See Constitutions of Art. 43, CONSTITUCiON NACION [CONST. NAC], (1994)
(Arg.); CONSTITUClON POLITICA DE LA REPCBLICA DE BOLIVIA, art. 222 (1967);
CONSTITUIQAo FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION]], art. 5 (1934) (Braz.); CONSTITUCION
POLITICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE COSTA RICA art. 48 (1989); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA
REPUBLICA DE EL SALVADOR, art. 182 (1991); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA
DE GUATEMALA, art. 265 (1985); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE
HONDURAS, art. 183 (1982); Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos
[C.P.], art. 107, (1917) (Mex.); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPCBLICA DE NICARAGUA
[CN.], art. 188 (1987); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPfBLICA DE PANAMA, art. 54
(1983); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE PARAGUAY, art. 134 (1992);
CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPCBLICA DE PERU, art. 200 (1993), and; CONSTITUCIoN
POLITICA DE LA REPBLICA DE VENEZUELA, art. 281 (1999).
58. Oquendo, supra note 13, at 262-63.
59. Id. at 270-71.
60. See generally VICTOR ARIAS AROCA, AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL: Uso v ABUSO,
ToDO SOBRE EL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL (Editorial Manta, 1st ed. 2001).
61. Ana Espinoza Diaz, Amparo Appeals: Problems Before, and After, the Reform,
2 INDRET (April 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1639033;
Enrique Gomez Santillan & Lucia Echeverria Galeas, La Inseguridad Juridica
Generada por la Mala Practica en el Amparo Constitucional (June 2003) (unpublished
master's thesis located at Instituto de los Altos Estudios Nacionales), available at
http://repositorio.iaen.edu.ec/bitstream/24000/228/1/IAEN-010-2003.pdf
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ceedings through specially appointed "constitutional" courts able
to more swiftly enforce their rulings. The rise of amparo suits
prompted the legislatures of several Latin American countries to
enact special statutes to further develop this procedural vehicle,
mainly with regard to its effects and scope.6 2
Even though, in general terms, the writ of amparo affords the
same kind of protection throughout the region, national legal sys-
tems have adopted different variations of this remedy. For exam-
ple, in some legal systems, amparo is basically implemented as a
mechanism to protect individual citizens against unlawful impris-
onment, similar to a writ of habeas corpus.63 In others, amparo
can also be asserted against state or public agencies for a direct
violation of a fundamental right,6 4 provided that such right is
expressly mentioned by the constitution.6 5 A broader and more
recent variation of amparo allows it to be also used as a remedy
against indirect violations of fundamental rights, that is, of those
rights not expressly protected by the constitution but nonetheless
regulated by statute.66
Further, in certain jurisdictions, amparo injunctions are
allowed in cases of alleged constitutional violations attributed to
private entities or individuals67 and may also be filed on behalf of
absent individuals, members of socially-defined groups or catego-
62. See generally ALLAN-RANDOLPH BREWER CARIAS & CARLOs AYALA CORAO, LA
LEY ORGANICA DE AMPARO SOBRE DERECHOS Y GARANTIAS CONSTITUCIONALES
(Editorial Juridica Venezolana, 2d ed. 1988); HECTOR Fix-ZAMUDIO & EDUARDO
FERRER MAC-GREGOR, EL DERECHO DE AMPARO EN EL MUNDO (Editorial Porrua, 1st
ed. 2006).
63. See generally NESTOR PEDRO SAGUES, AMPARO, HABEAS DATA Y HABEAS CORPUS
EN LA REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL (1994).
64. CONsTITuCloN POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR [CONSTITUTION] JUNE
5, 1998, art. 95.
65. Some Latin American constitutions have recently included a mechanism
specifically intended to protect the right to privacy and handling of personal
information (habeas data), which-with the exception of Argentina-is treated
separately from amparo. Compare Art. 43, CONSTITUCION NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.]
(Arg.); with CONSTITUIAo FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 5, 1988, art. 5 (Braz.);
CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE PARAGUAY, art. 135 (1992); CONSTITUCION
POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DEL PERO 1993 [CONSTITUTION] art. 200 section 3 (1993);
CoNSTITUcION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR [CONSTITUTION] Sept. 28,
2008, art. 95; CONSTITUCiON DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA [CONSTITUTION] July 4,
1991, art. 86; and CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA
[CONSTITUTION] Dec. 15, 1999, art. 27.
66. See generally MARIA DE LOS ANGELES EDUWIGES CHAVIRA, REFLEXIONES SOBRE
EL JUICIO DE AMPARO EN MATERIA CIVIL, DIRECTO E INDIRECTO (Editorial Porria, 2005);
RICHARD D. BAKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO: A STUDY OF THE Amparo Suit
(University of Texas Press, 1st ed. 1971).
67. See generally Jos6 Ignacio Martinez Estay, Los particulares como sujetos
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ries of individuals situated in a similar position to the plaintiff
(collective interests), and even on behalf of the general population
(diffuse interests).
As a result, the decision rendered on the merits in these col-
lective amparos (amparos colectivos) often has res judicata effects
beyond the "representative" parties and precludes any future
claims by anyone benefited from the decision.68 In many jurisdic-
tions, collective amparos are the only form of representative litiga-
tion allowed.6 9
Despite their versatility, collective amparos have an impor-
tant limitation. As these procedural vehicles are geared to protect
against the violation of constitutional rights, and their main goal
is to restore the status quo ex ante and not to compensate the vic-
tim in economic terms, amparo judgments are of purely injunctive
nature. Amparo injunctions are limited to order the defendant to
do, or to refrain from doing, certain acts and expressly foreclose
the possibility of awarding monetary damages to the petitioner."
Damages would have to be pursued in a separate trial as per the
ordinary rules of civil procedure.
The Latin American protection of collective rights beyond the
writ of amparo
The transition from dictatorship to democracy experienced by
several Latin American countries during the decade of the eight-
ies fostered the revival of key legal and political institutions and
their role in the protection of individual and collective rights. This
included the passage of important constitutional reforms, most of
which adopted principles that expressly protected the collective
and individual spheres of distinguishable social groups (intereses
colectivos) and also included guarantees for the safeguard of
broader interests, such as those related to the environment, public
health and economic welfare (intereses difusos).
These constitutional reform processes also shifted the center
of gravity from codes to constitutions. In addition, these reforms
also expanded their scope from the first (civil and political) and
second (social, economic and cultural) generation rights focused on
the individual to those rights that put emphasis on the defense of
pasivos de los derechos fundamentales: La doctrina del efecto horizontal de los
derechos, Numero Especial REVISTA CHILENA DE DERECHO 59-64 (1998).
68. See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion [CSJN] [National Supreme Court
of Justice], Feb. 24, 2009, "Halabi, Ernesto C. Poder Ejecutivo Nacional (P.E.N.) - Ley
25.873," dto. 1563/04 s/ amparo ley 16.986 (Arg.) [hereinafter Halabi].
69. Oquendo, supra note 13, at 262-65.
70. See generally BREWER-CARIAS & CORAO, supra note 62.
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collective interests, otherwise known as third generation rights."
This trend helped motivate governments to pay more attention to
policies dealing with consumer protection and to launch or sup-
port the expansion of public agencies and consumer advocate
groups.
To this date, more than a dozen Latin American constitutions
contain at least one provision that mentions consumer protection
as an important policy. 2 Such provisions, however, are often
framed as general guidelines (normas programdticas) that call for
further legislative action to develop the means through which
individuals and socially identifiable groups are able to obtain com-
pensation for harms.
An even greater number of countries have passed Consumer
Protection Acts (CPAs) as part of broad strategies that have
included the establishment of administrative agencies,
ombudsmen and defense groups vested with duties that range
from policymaking to education, training, and advocacy on behalf
of consumers through administrative and judicial processes.
Notwithstanding these important initiatives, Latin American
countries are still far behind-as compared with other regions of
71. See generally Lapeyre, Tinguy andVasak, supra note 31.
72. These are the Constitutions of the following countries: (1) Argentina,
CONSTITUCION NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] Aug. 22, 1994, art. 42 (Arg.); (2) Brazil,
CONSTITUIQAo FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 5, 1988, art. 5 (Braz.); (3)
Colombia, CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] July 4, 1991, art. 78; (4) Costa
Rica, Constitution Politica De La Republica De Costa Rica [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7,
1949, art. 46; (5) Ecuador, CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPCBLICA DEL ECUADOR
[CONSTITUTION] Sept. 28, 2008, art. 92; (6) El Salvador, CONSTITUCION DE LA
REPUBLICA DE EL SALVADOR [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 20, 1983, art. 101; (7) Guatemala,
CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE GUATEMALA [CONSTITUTION] May 31,
1985, arts. 119, 130; (8) Honduras, CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE
HONDURAS [CONSTITUTION] May 4, 2005, arts. 331, 347; (9) Nicaragua, CONSTITUCION
POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA [CN.] Jan. 9, 1987, art. 105, La Gaceta,
Diario Oficial [L.G.]; (10) Panama, CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPBLICA DE
PANAMA [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 11, 1972, art. 279; (11) Paraguay, REPOBLICA DE
PARAGUAY, CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE 1992 [CONSTITUTION] June 20, 1992, art. 72;
(12) Peru, CONSTITUCiON POLITICA DEL PER0 1993 [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 31, 1993, art.
65; and (13) Venezuela, CONSTITUCION DE LA REPOBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA
[CONSTITUTION] Dec. 15, 1999, art. 117.
73. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
(UNCTAD), STRENGTHENING INSTITUTIONS AND CAPABILITIES IN THE AREA OF
COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA: CASES OF
BOLIVIA, COSTA RICA, EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, GUATEMALA, NICARAGUA, AND PERU,
UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2004/3 (United Nations 2005), available at http://unctad.org/en/
Does/ditclp20043_en.pdf; see also Javier Lopez, Consumers Rights: Constitutional
Consecration in Latin America (Derechos Del Consumidor: Consagracion
Constitucional En Latinoamerica) (2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1488127.
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the world-with respect to the implementation of effective vehi-
cles for the protection against collective harms. Overall, consumer
protection statutes have been conceived in very general terms.
The powers granted to consumer protection agencies-even
though ample in theory-are generally confined to the interven-
tion in administrative or judicial proceedings that, when success-
ful, only result in the imposition of small fines or other symbolic
sanctions with little or no deterrent effect on the violators.74 One
of the most dramatic shortcomings of the current scheme is the
inability to effectively compensate victims and deter wrongdoers
from recurring harmful conduct.
General procedural rules traditionally adopted by most Latin
American national legal systems, such as the prohibition of con-
tingency fee arrangements, the inexistence of punitive damages,
and the prevalence of the loser-pays-all rule regarding lawyers'
fees, are also credited with posing additional obstacles that
impede the growth of consumer representative litigation in the
region." But as shown in Section III of this paper, there has been
change on that front.
Like Migratory Birds
The lack of effective remedies and the existence of several
important shortcomings within Latin American jurisdictions, in
conjunction with the perceived advantages of other legal systems,
has fueled a migratory wave of claimants from Latin America to
the United States,76 where the use of civil litigation as a tool for
regulating risk behavior and for compensating harms that affect
large groups of citizens has achieved a high level of sophistication
as a result of the confluence of certain economic, intellectual, pro-
cedural, and political factors." Consequently, Latin American citi-
zens have viewed the possibility of pursuing their claims in
United States courts as a panacea and have found in American
class actions an appropriate vehicle to channel their claims. The
general perception seems to be that the number of mass tort cases
filed in United States courts by foreign plaintiffs is on the rise."
74. See, e.g., Ley Federal de Protecci6n al Consumidor [Federal Consumer
Protection Act] Apr. 9, 2012, art. 125 et seq. (Mex.).
75. Gomez, supra note 2, at 296. R
76. Id. at 300.
77. RICHARD NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 1-6 (University
of Chicago Press 2007).
78. Wurmnest, supra note 1, at 205. R
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Not all foreign cases, however, make it to American courts,
and those that do are-arguably-subject to a stricter scrutiny
than that faced in their own jurisdictions. Foreign cases are also
screened and selected more carefully by American counsel to
determine feasibility from both legal and financial viewpoints.
American judges have also placed an additional barrier on foreign
parties by refusing to allow claims when there is a risk that a for-
eign court will not give preclusive effect to a judgment rendered in
the United States, thus allowing the plaintiff to successfully reliti-
gate the same case in multiple fora."9 On the other hand, the exis-
tence of blocking or claw-back statutes in Latin America also
poses an obstacle to those who consider bringing their claims in
United States courts."
While earlier empirical research showed that foreign plain-
tiffs tended to win a higher percentage of cases in United States
federal courts than domestic litigants,"' pursuing litigation in the
United States is not a stable long-term solution for Latin Ameri-
can plaintiffs.82 At the same time, an increasing number of con-
sumer-advocacy groups, grass-roots organizations, government
agencies, and actors throughout Latin America are currently lob-
bying for the regulation of class actions and similar procedural
vehicles.8 3 As a result, proposals for convergence toward the Amer-
ican model of group litigation seem to be gaining popularity
around the region.84
At the time of writing (September 2011), only a handful of
Latin American countries-Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile
and Mexico-have adopted statutes providing for class actions or
similar procedural mechanisms. While the predominant focus has
been on consumer class actions, at least three countries-Colom-
bia, Brazil and Mexico-have broadened the scope of these vehi-
cles to other areas such as environmental and securities
79. Buschkin, supra note 4, at 1577. R
80. Dahl, supra note 12, at 27. R
81. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1143 (1995).
82. See, e.g., Manuel A. G6mez, Like Migratory Birds: Latin American Claimants
in U.S. Courts and the Ford-Firestone Rollover Litigation, 11 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM.
281, 297 (2005).
83. See, e.g., Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil-A Model for Civil Law
Countries, 51 Am. J. COMP. L. 311, 329-30 (2003); GUSTAVO Maurino et al., Las
Acciones Colectivas (Lexis Nexis 2005) (Arg.).
84. Some, however, have warned against the adoption of a United States-style
class action model appealing to a series of fundamental differences between the U.S.
and Latin America. See, e.g., Gidi, supra note 83, at 330.
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litigation."
The regulatory framework of class actions in these countries
differs in several important aspects. While in some jurisdictions,
class actions are expressly backed by constitutional provisions and
therefore regarded as an important state policy;86 in others, class
actions are simply judge-made and lack statutory regulation."
There are also key differences regarding more technical issues
such as standing, certification, early settlement, opt-in and opt-
out procedures, litigation finance, fee-shifting rules, effect of the
decision on the merits, and types of awards. The most salient
aspects of each country are described in the following section.
III. THE REGULATION OF REPRESENTATIVE LITIGATION IN
LATIN AMERICA
Colombia
The protection of collective interests in Colombia can be
traced back to the declaratory relief mechanism set forth among
the traditional possessory actions in the country's 1887 Civil
Code." Article 1005, for example, gives standing to municipal
authorities and to any citizen seeking the demolition, repair, or
compensation for damages in connection to a risk or actual harm
posed by a building or construction." The same provision entitles
the plaintiff to obtain-as just compensation-one half of any
fines imposed on the malfeasor as well as attorney fees for an
amount no less than a tenth and no more than one third of the
cost of the demolition, repair, or compensation.0 Similar provi-
sions exist in other Latin American civil codes alongside tradi-
tional possessory actions (called interdictos).91
In spite of important procedural limitations, including the
fact that article 1005 actions could only be pursued through indi-
vidual litigation under the general rules of civil procedure; during
85. See infra Section III.
86. As it occurs in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. See infra Section III.
87. This can be found in the case of Argentina. See infra Section III.
88. See generally GERMAN SARMIENTO PALAcIo, LAS AccIONES POPULARES EN EL
DERECHO COLOMBIANO (1988).
89. CODIGO CIVIL [C.C.] art. 1476 (Colom.).
90. Id. Other popular actions included in the Civil Code to protect public goods are
the ones set forth in articles 1006, 1007, 2358, 2359 and 2360.
91. See Jorge Adame Goddard, Evoluci6n de los interdictos posesorios en Mixico
durante la primera mitad del siglo XIX, in MEMORIA DEL 11 CONGRESO DE HISTORIA
DEL DERECHO MEXICANO 4 (1980); PEDRO VILLAROEL RION, LA POSESION Y LOS
INTERDICTOS EN LA LEGISLACION VENEZOLANA 3 (1988).
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the late 1980s, several Article 1005 cases were successfully liti-
gated on behalf of large groups of consumers, thus paving the way
for a greater reception of popular and group actions in Colombia.
One of the most emblematic cases was the Alcalis litigation, which
was pursued against a large corporation by Fundaptiblico, a public
interest litigation group. Fundapblico based the claim, filed on
behalf of the inhabitants of a town located near a riverbank, on
the alleged pollution of the river by the defendant. 92
A series of successive court victories and growing support
from local and foreign donors strengthened Fundapfiblico. Its
members not only became successful lobbyists in a campaign to
include a constitutional provision mentioning the protection of
group rights,9 3 but also became successful lobbyists in the passage
of a statute regulating group litigation in Colombia. 94 Fundaptib-
lico also became known for pursuing environmental claims on
behalf of Colombian plaintiffs in United States courts, notably
during the Dow Chemical litigation.95
Beginning in 1982 with the passage of the Consumer Stat-
ute,9" Colombia further developed the basis for regulating aggre-
gate procedures geared to the defense of both private rights and
public interests. The Environmental Protection Act of 198997 and,
later, the 1991 Constitution," declared the protection of collective
rights a state policy and gave a boost to the prospect of regulating
class actions in Colombia.99 In 1998, the Colombian Congress
enacted the Popular and Group Actions Act (PGAC or Law 472),
the main objective of which was to develop the principles set forth
in Article 88 of the 1991 Constitution.0 0 As a result, PGAC created
two different types of action, acci6n popular (popular action) and
acci6n de grupo (group action). The former is a procedural vehicle
geared to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief, instead of mone-
92. Mariana Sarmiento Aparicio, Biografia de German Sarmiento Palacio, in LAS
ACCIONES POPULARES PRIVADAS EN EL DERECHO COLOMBIANO 19 (2006).
93. CONsTITucioN POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 86.
94. L. 472, augusto 5, 1998, [art. 1] DIARIO OFICIAL [DO.] (Colom.).
95. Aparicio, supra note 92, at 28.
96. L. 3466, diciembre 2, 1982, DiAIo OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
97. L. 9/38650, enero 11, 1989, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
98. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 88.
99. Id. ("The law will regulate popular actions for the protection of collective rights
and interests related to the homeland, space, public safety and health, administrative
morality, the environment, free economic competition, and others of a similar nature.
It will also regulate the actions arising out of harm caused to a large number of
individuals, without barring appropriate individual action. In some way, the law will
also define cases of civil liability for harm caused to collective rights and interests.").
100. L. 472, agosto 5, 1998, [art. 1] DiAIo OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
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tary damages, for violations deemed against the public interest.''
Group actions, on the other hand, were devised to offer a redress
mechanism to a group, category or class of individuals uniformly
situated with respect to an event or product that allegedly have
caused them harm.
Popular actions may be filed in response to a broad range of
situations, from the protection of a healthy environment to the
preservation of the public decorum, ecologic balance, natural
resources, public spaces, safety, and the guarantee of equal access
to public services. 02 Given the fact that popular actions are geared
to protect the public interest and not the rights of a specific group,
Article 13 PGAC enables any citizen or group of citizens to bring a
popular action regardless of whether they have sustained any
direct harm.10 3
As a way to facilitate access to judicial remedies even further,
PGAC waived the requirement for plaintiffs to retain legal coun-
sel,'0 4 but provides that the Ombudsman's office (Defensoria del
Pueblo)0 ' shall be given notice of the proceedings so it can inter-
vene on behalf of the public.'06 Moreover, PGAC also gives stand-
ing to other government agencies either as parties proper'07 or
intervenors,'o including the Attorney General, district and munic-
ipal officials, and non-governmental organizations.'0 9
Another important incentive offered to popular action plain-
tiffs is the possibility of requesting a waiver of court fees and other
expenses connected to the proceedings."0 Plaintiffs are also
exempted from the general fee-shifting rule, unless their claims
are deemed frivolous or found to be filed in bad faith."' Moreover,
indigent parties can request that litigation be financed by the
Fund for the Defense of Collective Rights and Interests (FDCR)
established under Article 71, c, d PGAC.112 In such case, the
101. Id. art. 2; see Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], junio 8, 2004,
Sentencia C-225/04 (Colom.); see also Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional
Court], abril 14, 1999, Sentencia C-215/99 (Colom.).
102. L. 472, agosto 5, 1998, [arts. 2, 4] DiARno OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
103. Id. arts. 12, 13.
104. Id. art. 13.
105. CONSTITuCiON POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 282.
106. L. 472, agosto 5, 1998, [art. 13] DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
107. Id. art. 12.
108. Id. art. 24.
109. Id. art. 13.
110. Id. art. 19.
111. L. 472, agosto 5, 1998, [art. 38] DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
112. Id. art. 71(c), (d).
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Ombudsman's office is given discretion to determine how much
assistance can be offered.113 Conversely, ten percent of any award
monies obtained in cases litigated with financial assistance from
the FDCR shall be paid back to contribute to its capital.1 14 Even
though Articles 39 and 40 of the PGAC originally conceived a mon-
etary incentive under which prevailing plaintiffs were entitled to
a success fee, a special statute abrogated both provisions in
2010.115
Given their scope, popular actions are subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of contentious administrative courts."' Judges are
vested with ample powers to issue precautionary measures,"' pro-
mote an early settlement," and order the production of ample evi-
dentiary means."9 Finally, the decision rendered on the merits
will have general effects (erga omnes).120
As mentioned earlier, the second type of procedural vehicle
included in PGAC is the group action.12' A representative acting
on behalf of a class may commence group actions. 12 2 A class is
defined by the existence of uniform conditions with respect to an
event alleged to have inflicted harm on each and all of its mem-
bers. 2 3 Unlike popular actions, group actions are expressly
intended to seek monetary compensation for individual damages
suffered by class members.124
PGAC does not require the representative party claims to be
typical of the rest of the class, but simply requires that the cause
of the alleged harm is common to all class members and that the
113. Id. art. 73.
114. Id. art. 70(g).
115. L. 1425, diciembre 29, 2010, [art. 1] DiARio OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.). The
incentives ranged between ten and 150 times the minimum wage, or fifteen percent of
whatever monies were recovered in popular actions involving corruption charges. See
L. 472, agosto 5, 1998, [art. 39, 40] DIARIO OFICIAL [DO.] (Colom.).
116. L. 472, agosto 5, 1998, [art. 15] DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
117. Id. arts. 17, 25.
118. Id. art. 27.
119. Id. art. 28.
120. Id. art. 35. However, on August 14, 2007, the Colombian Constitutional Court
created an exception to the resjudicata effect of the decision on the merits, if new and
"transcendental" evidence is uncovered after the dismissal of a popular action. See
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 14, 2007, Sentencia C-622/
07, publication name [publication abbreviation] (publication volume and/or number),
page number (Colom.).
121. L. 472, agosto 6, 1998, [art. 46] DIARIO OFICIAL (D.O.) (Colom.).
122. Id. art. 48.
123. Id. art. 46.
124. Id.
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class is comprised of at least twenty people.'25 As in the case of
popular actions, the Ombudsman, district and municipal officials
each have standing to intervene on behalf of parties lacking
representation.12 6
In addition, PGAC requires that the Ombudsman be notified
of the filing of every new group action so she can ponder whether
to intervene.127 The Ombudsman is also assigned the role of an
early settlement facilitator,128 which is obviously problematic for it
seems to create a conflict of interest between the ombudsman as
defender of the consumer and her role as mediator between the
parties.1 2 9
Depending on whether the action is instituted against a pub-
lic agency or private actors performing a public role, or simply
against private parties, jurisdiction over group actions will fall
either to the contentious administrative courts or the ordinary
civil courts.130 With respect to class certification, the only two fac-
tors analyzed by the court to decide whether a claim should pro-
ceed as a group action are whether the alleged harm by all class
members arose out of a common cause,'3 ' and whether the two-
year statute of limitation has expired.13 2
Once the class is certified, the court shall direct notice to class
members so they can opt-in and be treated as original parties,
given that they join before the start of the evidentiary phase.133
Class members who did not participate in the proceedings may
still opt-in within twenty days of the final ruling on the merits,
but may not invoke exemplary damages or partake in any fee
awards.'34 Conversely, PGAC also provides class members with an
125. Id. On February 13, 2008, the Colombian Constitutional Court clarified that
the twenty-person threshold does not refer to the number of representative plaintiffs,
but rather, it refers to an identifiable group of individuals that form the class. See
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 13, 2008, Sentencia C-116/
08.
126. L. 472, agosto 5, 1998, [art. 48] DIARIO OFICIAL (D.O) (Colom.).
127. Id. art. 53.
128. Id. art. 61.
129. While it is true that article 61 indicates that when the Ombudsman has acted
as plaintiff and the mediator function will be performed by a representative of the
Attorney General, that still does not guarantee any kind of neutrality because the
Ombudsman's general duty would still be to protect the interests of consumers and
ordinary citizens. Id. art. 61.
130. Id. at art. 50.
131. Id. at art. 3.
132. Id. at art. 47.
133. Id. at art. 53.
134. Id. at art. 55. The constitutional court abrogated the requirement that the
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opportunity to opt-out within five days following the term estab-
lished to effect service of process.135
Unlike popular actions, Colombian group actions require
plaintiffs to be represented by legal counsel, 136 and the statute also
provides for the formation of a plaintiff steering committee (PSC)
led by the counsel that represents the largest number of parties.3 1
Lead counsel shall be appointed by the judge 38 and is entitled to a
fee equal to ten percent of the total monies awarded to any absent
parties. 139 The statute also provides that a settlement hearing
shall be held immediately after the opt-out phase. If no agreement
is reached, the proceedings shall continue until a final decision is
reached on the merits.'40 The decision will have resjudicata effects
for those class members who did not opt-out.'4 ' Finally, the alloca-
tion of individual awards established by the final decision shall be
administered by the FDCR, which, as explained earlier, is under
the supervision of the Ombudsman's office.'42
In addition to regulating the procedural aspects of group and
popular actions, PGAC established a public registry of popular
and group actions to be managed by the Ombudsman's office.14 3
The statute also charged the government with the duty to set up
educational programs intended to raise awareness on the protec-
tion of collective rights,'4 4 and also to facilitate the establishment
of civil society organizations for the defense of collective rights.145
Brazil
The enactment of the lei da agdo civil publica (LACP) in
1985146 and the c6digo de defesa do consumidor of 1990 (CDC)147
placed Brazil at the forefront of the movement to promote con-
statute of limitations had not lapsed with respect to these class members. See Corte
Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court] abril 10, 2009, Decision C-241-09.
135. L. 472 agosto 5, 1998, [art. 56] DIARIO OFICIAL (D.O.) (Colom.).
136. Id. at art. 49.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at art. 65-66.
140. Id. at art. 61.
141. L. 472 agosto 5, 1998, [art. 66] DIARIO OFICIAL (D.O.) (Colom.).
142. Id. at art. 72.
143. Id. at art. 80.
144. Id. at art. 85.
145. Id. at art. 81.
146. Lei No. 7.347, de 24 24 de Julho de 1985 (Braz.), available at http://www.
planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L7347orig.htm.
147. Lei No. 8.078, de 11 de Setembro de 1990 (Braz.), available at http://www.
planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L8078.htm.
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sumer class actions in Latin America.'48 Consistent with the prin-
ciples outlined in article 5 of the 1988 Brazilian constitution,
which deemed the protection of consumer rights a duty of the
state,14 9 LACP and CDC created a procedural vehicle that further
developed representative litigation in that country.
Prior to the enactment of these two statutes, however, Brazil
had already recognized the importance of protecting collective
rights and had created limited procedural remedies that sought
the annulment of public acts deemed to go against basic constitu-
tional principles. The Constitution of 1934, for example, created a
procedure (actio popularis) to challenge statutory acts deemed to
affect the public interest.'
In 1965, a special statute called lei da agdo popular (LAP) was
passed as a way to expand the remedies against acts affecting gov-
ernment entities."' One of LAP's main contributions was to loosen
the limitations with respect to standing and to enable any citizen
to bring a public action without having to meet any special qualifi-
cation. After all, LAP's main goal was to protect the interest of the
general population and not the rights of individuals or specific
groups. LAP, however, did not address the issue of claim
aggregation.
Decades later, the passage of both LACP and CDC made pos-
sible the collection of large numbers of small individual claims
against private actors. Cases arising out of the same factual or
legal circumstances common to a group, class or category of con-
sumers were now candidates for aggregation. 15 2 One important
limitation, however, was that these procedures were confined only
to claims related to the protection of the environment, consumer
rights, and rights related to artistic, aesthetic and historic
values. 5 3
148. See generally Beatriz Londono Toro, Analisis de las estadisticas sobre acciones
populares y derechos colectivos, 29 REVISTA TUTELA, ACCIONES POPULARES Y DE
CUMPLIMIENTO 1211, 1211 (2002); see generally Ada Pellegrini Grinover, Hacia Un
Sistema Iberoamericano de Tutela de Intereses Transindividuales, in LA TUTELA DE
LOS DERECHOs DIFusos, COLECTIVOS E INDIVIDUALEs HOMOGENEOS (2004); Grinover,
supra note 13, at 63. R
149. CONSTITUJQAo FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5 (Braz.).
150. CONSTITUIQAO DA REPUBLICA DOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DO BRASIL, de 16 de Julho
de 1934 (Braz.), available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 03/constituicao/
constitui%C3%A7ao34.htm.
151. Lei No. 4.717, de 29 de Junio de 1965, (Braz.), available at http://www.
planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L4717.htm; see also Gidi, supra note 83 at 326 n. 26;
Keith S. Rosenn, Civil Procedure in Brazil, 34 Am. J. COMP. L. 487, 517 (1986).
152. Lei No. 8.078, de 11 de Setembro de 1990, art. 81 (Braz.).
153. See Rosenn, supra note 151, at 522. R
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With respect to the type of rights that warrant collective pro-
tection, CDC distinguishes between diffuse, collective and individ-
ual-homogeneous rights.'5 4 The first category is comprised of
"trans-individual and indivisible rights" that belong to an unde-
termined group of individuals not necessarily connected with each
other except for the specific factual event that gave rise to the liti-
gation, such as an environmental disaster. Diffuse rights usually
refer to the preservation of the public good, as opposed to individ-
ual or group interests.' 5 Collective rights are "trans-individual
and indivisible" but are specifically tied to a group, category or
class determined by common elements of law or a pre-existing
legal relationship."1 5  Lastly, individual-homogeneous rights are
subjective rights but of common origin or cause. The common ori-
gin of these rights is precisely what makes the aggregation of
numerous claims for judicial adjudication possible.
The openness of CDC in allowing different categories of right
holders to bring class action suits appears to be in contrast with
the rather restrictive rules on standing, which only allow suits
filed by the Public Prosecutor (Minist6rio Publico), states, munici-
palities, the Federal District, and consumer associations that com-
ply with a number of prerequisites. These prerequisites include
being established for at least one year prior to the filing of the
suit.' In any case, even if the Public Prosecutor does not appear
as plaintiff, CDC requires that she be still notified of the proceed-
ings' as a way to ensure that absent parties are adequately
represented. 59
CDC also enabled the filing of claims against multiple defend-
ants by allowing the plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil of differ-
ent entities and consolidate claims against them in a single suit.160
In order to enable potential claimants to join the litigation as par-
ties, CDC also requires that, at least in the case of damage class
actions,161 the notice requirement be fulfilled with publication in
an official paper. 16 2 The same provision authorizes consumer pro-
tection agencies to divulge the existence of the class action
154. Lei No. 8.078, de 11 de Setembro de 1990, art. 81 (Braz.).
155. See Gidi, supra note 83, at 350, 355.
156. Id. at 356.
157. Lei No. 8.078, de 11 de Setembro de 1990, art. 82(B) (Braz.).
158. Id. at art. 92.
159. See Gidi, supra note 83, at 339.
160. Lei No. 8.078, de 11 de Setembro de 1990, art. 28 (Braz.).
161. See Gidi, supra note 83, at 342.
162. Lei No. 8.078, de 11 de Setembro de 1990, art. 94 (Braz.).
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through other media outlets, in case they deem it adequate.163
Naturally, one of the most important effects of the procedural
vehicle devised by CDC is the expansion of the res judicata effects
of the decision rendered during the declaratory phase to the gen-
eral population (erga omnes) or to any potential members of the
group, class, or category of plaintiff (ultra partes).164 As a result, no
new suit arising out of the same claims subject to the class action
litigation can be brought again before a court.165 Interestingly,
Article 103 of the CDC also contains language that enables indi-
vidual class members to pursue separate actions should the collec-
tive proceedings prove unsuccessful.16 6 Interestingly, Article 103 of
the CDC also contains language that enables individual class
members to pursue separate actions should the collective proceed-
ings prove unsuccessful.167
The Brazilian regulatory scheme has been perceived as
including a series of innovative features.' These include shifting
the burden of proof to the defendant, adopting a strict liability
rule that relieves the plaintiff from having to establish the defen-
dant's culpability,169 and exempting the plaintiff from paying court
fees and other related expenses.170 Nevertheless, as a practical
matter these perceived incentives have neither translated into a
surge in the filing of class actions nor into a large number of victo-
ries for plaintiffs. Rather, the contrary is what seems to have
happened.
Take, for example, the class action lawsuits filed in Brazilian
courts against tobacco manufacturers. Tobacco suits are by far the
largest in terms of scope, alleged damages, remedies sought, and
cost. Out of the ten collective cases litigated in Brazil since 1995,
plaintiffs have not yet prevailed in a single one. The first of these
cases was a class action lawsuit brought in the courts of Sio Paulo
163. Id.
164. Lei No. 8.078, de 11 de Setembro de 1990, art. 103 (Braz.).
165. In Brazil, as in most countries following the civil law tradition, the resjudicata
effects only apply to claims and do not apply to issues as they occur in the United
States, which allows issue preclusion or collateral estoppel. See Gidi, supra note 83, at
385.
166. Lei No. 8.078, supra note 147, at art. 103; see also Gidi, supra note 83, at 389.
167. See CDC at art. 103; see also Gidi, supra note 83, at 39.
168. See, e.g., Gidi, supra note 83, at 339.
169. See CDC at art. 12 ("National or foreign manufacturers, producers,
constructors, and importers are liable, regardless of the existence of culpability, for
the redress of damages caused to consumers by defects from design, manufacture,
construction, assembly, formula, handling, presentation or packaging of products, as
well as for the improper or incomplete information about their use and risks.").
170. Id. at art. 87.
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by the Association for the Defense of the Health of Smokers
(ADESF or Associagdo de Defesa da Saude do Fumante) against
Souza Cruz-the subsidiary of British American Tobacco-and
Philip Morris Brazil.' ADESF filed a suit on behalf of all smoking
consumers who, according to the complaint, had been deceived by
the defendants' misleading and abusive advertising practices.1 72
Among other requests, plaintiffs asked the court to order defend-
ants to pay each Brazilian smoker a certain amount per year they
had used cigarettes.
In 2004, the trial court sided with ADESF and issued an
unprecedented ruling ordering defendants to pay R$ 30 billion17 3
in damages to all Brazilian smokers (R$ 1,0001' per person per
year she had smoked)."' In 2008, this ruling was reversed by the
Seventh Civil Chamber of the Court of Appeals for the State of
Sio Paulo.' The Court of Appeals, which has consistently
rejected this type of claim, vacated the award on grounds that the
lower court had violated the defendants' due process by not
allowing them to produce expert evidence during the trial."' The
case was remanded to the trial court for production of new evi-
dence and a new decision on the merits."' After being fully liti-
gated once more, the case was finally dismissed on May 27,
2011.17' This decision was one more in a string of court rulings
handed down by at least fifteen Brazilian state courts,so as well as
the Superior Court of Justice,'8 ' denying claims filed against
171. See D.J.S.P., Processo no. 583.00.1995.523167-5, Associagao de Defesa da
Saude do Furnante (ADESF) v. Souza Cruz S/Al e Philip Morris Marketing S/A, 07-
04-2004 (Braz.) (on file with author).
172. Id.
173. Approximately, US $19.2 billion as of July 2, 2011.
174. Approximately, US $642 as of July 2, 2011.
175. See T.J.S.P., Processo no. 583.00.1995.523167-5, Associagao de Defesa da
Saude do Fumante (ADESF) v. Souza Cruz S/A/ e Philip Morris Marketing S/A, 07-04-
2004, 5 (Braz.) (on file with author).
176. See T.J.S.P., Apelagao Civel com Revisao no. 479.713-4/8-00, Philip Morris
Brasil, S.A. v. Associagao de Defesa da Saude do Fumante (ADESF), 12-11-2008
(Braz.).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See T.J.S.P., Processo no. 583.00.1995.523167-5, Associagao de Defesa da
Saude do Fumante (ADESF) v. Souza Cruz S/A e Philip Morris Marketing S/A, 16-05-
2011 (Braz.).
180. Brazilian Court Rejects Main Class Action Filed Against Cigarette
Manufacturers, PR NEWSWIRE (May 27, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/brazilian-court-rejects-main-class-action-filed-against-cigarette-
manufacturers-122716493.html.
181. Id.
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tobacco manufacturers. 18 2
Despite the setbacks suffered by tobacco plaintiffs whose
claims have been consistently dismissed, other consumers have
had better luck in obtaining favorable outcomes, or at least in
pressing the courts to devise deterrents traditionally absent in
Latin America-such as exemplary damages. Brazilian judges, as
well as their other Latin American counterparts, have tradition-
ally rejected the possibility of awarding damages that go beyond
the actual compensation for an actual harm and have often con-
sidered exemplary or punitive damages to go against public policy.
Notwithstanding, increased pressure from consumer advocacy
groups coupled with an inadequate administrative sanctioning
regime, have pressed civil judges to come up with other deterrents
that are more effective. 183
One solution found by Brazilian courts is to award moral
damages in lieu of punitive damages.184 Moral damages are
allowed by most Latin American civil code countries as a form of
compensation to those who have suffered mental anguish,
degraded reputation, emotional injury, or social humiliation.'
Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but judges have a sig-
nificant degree of discretion in determining the amount
awarded.186 In order to be entitled to moral damages, the plaintiff
needs only to prove the defendant's breach of duty (not the actual
harm). In the case of economic damages, on the other hand, the
victim also needs to prove and quantify the extent of the actual
harm, which is more difficult.
Because of the discretion vested in the judges to calculate the
amount of moral damages and the relative ease with which plain-
tiffs can assert them in court, some have found moral damages to
be a second-best solution. In a 2008 case involving an individual
182. Id.
183. See, e.g. T.J.S.P., Apelagao Civel com Revisao no. 479.713-4/8-00, Philip Morris
Brasil, S.A. v. Associagao de Defesa da Saude do Fumante (ADESF), Dec. 11, 2008
(Braz.) (on file with author).
184. Id.
185. See Jorge A. Vargas, Moral Damages Under the Civil Law of Mexico. Are These
Damages Equivalent to Punitive Damages?, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-Am. L. REV. 183, 248
(2004); Edith Friedler, Moral Damages in Mexican Law: A Comparative Approach, 8
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 235, 248 (1986); Saul Litvinoff, Moral Damages, 38
LA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1977).
186. See generally Jorge A. Vargas, Moral Damages Under the Civil Law of Mexico.
Are These Damages Equivalent to Punitive Damages?, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
183, 208 (2004); Edith Friedler, Moral Damages in Mexican Law: A Comparative
Approach, 8 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 235 (1986); Saul Litvinoff, Moral
Damages, 38 LA. L. REV. 1 (1977).
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consumer claim filed against a telephone company, the Sixth Civil
Chamber of the Court of Appeals for the Mato Grosso State did
exactly that. The plaintiffs main allegation was that he was mis-
takenly included on a list of delinquent debtors, which resulted in
significant damage to his credit score and relationships with other
providers. The court sided with the plaintiff and awarded him R$
41,500 in compensatory damages.
In addition, as a way to "deter (the agent) from incurring in
the same conduct again,""' the court also awarded the plaintiff R$
9 million in moral damages and expressly acknowledged "the
punitive character of the award."' The court put particular
emphasis on the fact that, in addition to compensating the victim
for his suffering, such a high award would also "intimidate the
defendant, and deter him from incurring again in a similar harm-
ful conduct."18 9
Proponents of consumer legislation reform and class actions
in Latin America have advocated for the adoption of statutes pro-
viding for punitive damages, with very little success to date. At
the time of writing, Argentina seems to be the only jurisdiction
that allows punitive damages, but those punitive damages are
confined to a specific type of dispute.1 90
Argentina
The possibility of awarding punitive damages or multas
civiles (civil fines)'9 ' is one of the most salient innovations of
Argentina's 2008 amendment to the Ley de Defensa del Con-
sumidor (LDC). LDC extends this form of judicial deterrent to
both contractual and non-contractual disputes. The statute also
gives ample discretion to the judge in calculating the specific
amount of punitive awards, the only limit being that it should not
exceed $AR 5 million.192
More generally, and similar to what occurs in Colombia1 9 3 and
Brazil, 94 LDC gives standing to consumer associations, municipal
187. See T.J.M.T., Ap. Civ. No. 86538/2008, Manoel Goncalo de Alcantara v.
Telemat Cellular S.A., 17-09-2008, 1 (Braz.).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Law No. 26361, Mar. 12, 2008, B.O. 31378, art. 25 (Arg.) [hereinafter LDC
20081.
191. Id.
192. Id. at art. 25, art. 21(b).
193. See supra Colombia in this section.
194. See supra Brazil in this section.
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agencies, the ombudsman, and the Ministerio Piiblico (Public
Prosecutor, hereinafter "PP") to bring judicial actions on behalf of
consumers whose rights have allegedly been violated."' While
LDC mentions the possibility of both individual and collective
actions,19 6 the regulation of the latter is confined to two provisions.
The first provision simply provides that consumer associations are
required to apply for court approval to join any collective
proceedings.9 7
Article 27 of the LDC, the second provision referring to collec-
tive litigation, is more comprehensive. It regulates several impor-
tant aspects of collective litigation, ranging from the scope of
settlement and opt-out rules to the effects of the final decision on
the merits and the disbursement of award funds."' LDC expressly
encourages the early settlement of consumer claims and subjects
them to judicial approval.19 9 Should a proposed settlement be
approved, the LDC provides that class members should be
afforded an opportunity to opt-out." The statute, however, falls
short of establishing any concrete mechanism by which class
members are allowed to exercise this right.201' The specific opt-out
procedure is hence left entirely to the judge's discretion with no
other guidance than what the parties might propose. In any event,
a final settlement agreement or judicial decision on the merits
shall have res judicata effects upon the parties and all those simi-
larly situated, with the obvious exception of those class members
who opted out.20 2
Article 27 of the LDC also gives judges ample discretion in
devising a system for the disbursement of settlement monies,
including the formation of sub-classes or sub-categories of plain-
tiffs for more efficient management of settlements.20 3 Judges are
also given the role of settlement fund managers and are granted
authority to allow individual claimants to continue pursuing their
claims separately whenever the settlement agreement only
includes compensation for collective harms and not individual
remedies.204
195. LDC 2008 at art. 24.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at art. 27.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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With respect to the PP, given her role as guarantor of legality
and public order, her intervention is deemed compulsory, and she
shall remain a party even if the plaintiff decides to withdraw her
claim."' Furthermore, the PP is also allowed to object or comment
on any proposed settlement submitted to the judge for approval,
unless the PP is already intervening as a party representative, in
which case, only the judge's opinion is necessary.2 06
Consumer associations, on the other hand, require judicial
authorization to intervene on behalf of individual or collective
plaintiffs.2 07 Moreover, consumer associations are also subject to a
series of prerequisites to operate.2 08 They are expected to remain
completely independent209 and may only perform activities geared
toward defending, informing and educating consumers. Consumer
associations are also barred from engaging in political activism2 10
and cannot receive contributions from private, public, domestic or
foreign companies.211 Given these significant limitations, funding
is obviously a problem for Argentine consumer associations, as
they depend almost exclusively on government support to func-
tion, and the public resources set aside for them are generally
scarce.2 12 In addition, one could also argue that consumer associa-
tions' dependence on public resources hinders their autonomy.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned obstacles, plaintiffs in
consumer cases, collective or individual, regardless of their socio-
economic status or need, are automatically granted the benefit of
litigating in forma pauperis (IFP) and are therefore exempted
from court costs as well as witness and expert fees. 3 Moreover,
the IFP benefit also extends to attorney's fees.214 Defendants, on
the other hand, have to bear their own court costs and attorney
fees and also the prevailing party's attorney fees. This is yet
another feature that makes Argentine consumer litigation high-
risk for defendants and significantly inexpensive and low-risk for
plaintiffs. Even though the rationale behind the IFP rule has been
205. Id. at art. 24.
206. Id. at art. 27.
207. Id. at art. 28, 58; Law No. 24240, Oct. 15, 1993, [LJJJ-D] A.D.L.A. 4125, art. 58
(Arg.) [hereinafter LDC 1993].
208. LDC 1993, supra note 207, at art. 56, 57.
209. Id. at art. 57(b).
210. Id. at art. 57(a).
211. Id. at art. 57(c).
212. See Resoluci6n 105/2005, June 30, 2005, B.O. 30.685 (Arg.), available at http://
www.diputados-catamarea.gov.ar/ley/B02005/BO300605.PDF.
213. LDC 2008 at art. 26, 28.
214. Id.
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to facilitate consumer access to the court system, it has also been
criticized for encouraging abusive filing of claims and creating a
significant power imbalance between the parties.215
In addition to LDC, several provincial statutes216 and appel-
late court decisions 217 have opened the door to collective litigation
in Argentina. Since at least 2002, different class action bills have
been lingering in the Argentine Congress with no clear indication
of when or if they will be passed anytime soon.218 Some older stat-
utes, such as the Ley 23551 de Asociaciones Sindicales (Unions
Act)2 19 and the Ley 25675 General del Ambiente (General Environ-
mental Act),220 have enabled different actors such as unions,22 1 the
Ombudsman and ordinary citizens,2 22 to represent collective rights
in court.
The strongest endorsement to class actions, however, has
come from the Argentine Supreme Court (CSJN) and its Halabi
decision, handed down on February 24, 2009.223 The case involved
a collective amparo suit filed by attorney Ernesto Halabi whereby
he challenged the constitutionality of what the Argentine media
touted the "Ley Espia" (Spy Law), 224 a statute that authorized the
wiretapping of all telephone and Internet communications. Acting
in his own name and on behalf of all users of telecommunication
services in Argentina, Halabi sought to repeal the Spy Law, argu-
215. See Hector A. Mairal, Collective and Class Actions in Argentina, National
Report, The Globalization of Class Actions Conference Proceedings 23 (Dec. 2007),
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/content/collective-and-class-actions-argentina.
216. Accord Law No. 11723 y decr. 4371/1995, Buenos Aires, Dec. 22, 1995, B.O. 22-
12-95 (Arg.), available at http://www.opds.gba.gov.ar/index.php/leyes/ver/64
[hereinafter Ley 11723]; Law No. 6944 directo reglamentario 2260/01, Mendoza, Nov.
6, 2001, B.O. 29-11-01 (Arg.) [hereinafter CPC Tucuman] (Arg.).
217. Mairal, supra note 215, at 9-10.
218. See id. at 25. The first bill was submitted in 2002 by congressman Bauza. Id.
In 2005, two bills were submitted, one by congressman Batuzzi, and the other one by
representatives Camaho y Urtubey. Id. Congressman Urtubey presented again
another bill in 2007. Id. In 2009, two more similar bills were submitted again to the
Argentine Congress. Id. None made it past deliberations. Id.; See also Anthony
Andrade, William Crampton & Diego Gandolfo, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP,
International Class Action Bulletin, July 31, 2009, available at www.shb.com/
newsletters/ICAB/ICAB73109.pdf.
219. Law No. 23511, Apr. 14, 1988, [LVI-C] A.D.L.A. 3321 (Arg.).
220. Law No. 25676, Nov. 27, 2002, B.O. 28 - 11 - 2002 (Arg.).
221. Id. at art. 47.
222. Id. at art. 19.
223. See Halabi, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion [CSJN] [National
Supreme Court of Justice], Feb. 24, 2009, "Halabi, Ernesto C. Poder Ejecutivo
Nacional (P.E.N.) - Ley 25.873," dto. 1563/04 s/ amparo ley 16.986 (Arg.).
224. Law No. 25873, Feb. 6, 2004, B.O. 30335 (Arg.); Law No. 1563/04, Nov. 9, 2004
(Arg.).
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ing that it violated the right to privacy of an undetermined num-
ber of Argentine citizens as well as most attorney-client privileged
communications, including those between Halabi and his
clients.2
Both the lower court and the National Chamber of Appeals
(NCA) accepted the petitioner's arguments and declared the law
unconstitutional.22 6 The res judicata effect of their decisions was
extended to "all telecommunications users" regardless of whether
they had joined the court proceedings.2 27 In affirming the lower
court's judgment, CSJN went further and asserted Halabi's status
as a class action. Although filed by an individual citizen, Halabi
involved the rights of a large group of "divisible individual inter-
ests" tied by common elements of fact and law. This, CSJN said,
justified the aggregation of all individual claims into a single trial
that would produce res judicata effects with respect to all.2" Indi-
vidual damages, however, should be determined separately.229
CSJN acknowledged that, while no federal class action stat-
ute had been enacted in Argentina, the right to an effective judi-
cial remedy2 30 set forth in Article 43 of the 1994 Constitution2 31
gave the Court ample power to devise a suitable mechanism for
the defense of collective rights.2 32 A remedy akin to Rule 23 of the
U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 2 33 was, according to
the Court, appropriate in this case.24
CSJN identified four requisites for a claim, such as the one
filed by Halabi, to proceed as a class action. First, there had to be
a single or complex event producing harm to a significant group of
individual rights (common elements of fact). Second, the claims
asserted by the class had to be superior to the potential individual
claims of each member (superiority). Third, the claims were prac-
225. See Halabi, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion [CSJN] [National
Supreme Court of Justice], Feb. 24, 2009, "Halabi, Ernesto C. Poder Ejecutivo
Nacional (P.E.N.) - Ley 25.873," dto. 1563/04 s/ amparo ley 16.986 (Arg.), at 1.
226. Id. at 2.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 11.
229. Id. at 7, 12.
230. Id. at 8, 12.
231. Art. 43, Constitucion Nacional [Const. Nac.] (Arg.).
232. See Halabi, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion [CSJN] [National
Supreme Court of Justice], Feb. 24, 2009, "Halabi, Ernesto C. Poder Ejecutivo
Nacional (P.E.N.) - Ley 25.873," dto. 1563/04 s/ amparo ley 16.986 (Arg.), at 16.
233. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
234. See Halabi, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion [CSJN] [National
Supreme Court of Justice], Feb. 24, 2009, "Halabi, Ernesto C. Poder Ejecutivo
Nacional (P.E.N.) - Ley 25.873," dto. 1563/04 s/ amparo ley 16.986 (Arg.) at 16.
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ticable only when filed in an aggregate fashion. Finally, the class
had to be adequately represented.23 5 CSJN concluded that all four
requisites were present in Halabi.23 6
In addition to the aforementioned prerequisites, the Court
offered guidance on other elements that should be taken into
account when dealing with potential aggregate cases in the future.
This involved devising an adequate procedure for giving notice to
potential class members so they can opt out or remain involved in
the litigation. It also included the adoption of mechanisms geared
to avoid the re-litigation of the same issues in different proceed-
ings.237 Ideally, these and other aspects should be the subject of
special legislation. Meanwhile, Argentine courts continue to rely
on the principles set forth in Halabi, which only seem to address
injunctive relief class actions and not those seeking monetary
relief.
Chile23 8
Unlike Argentina, where the strongest support for class
actions has come from the courts instead of statutes, Chile has
enacted a much more elaborate procedural scheme for class
actions that gravitates around the Ley de Protecci6n al Con-
sumidor of 2004 (Consumer Protection Act, or CPA). 239 Despite
warnings of a potential surge in class action litigation fueled by
the 2004 CPA amendment,24 0 only fifty-seven class action lawsuits
were filed in Chile between 2004 and 2010.241 From this universe,
almost eighty percent of the cases were filed in the courts of Santi-
ago, the country's capital,242 and the majority referred to abusive
commercial practices including the overcharging of fees for certain
services, such as banking and retail transactions.24 3
235. Id. at 6.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 10.
238. For a more detailed description of the Chilean class action regime, see
Conference Report, Martin Gubbins & Carla Lopez, Stanford Law School, The
Globalization of Class Actions Conference (Dec. 13-14, 2007), http://www.law.
stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events media/Chile National Report.pdf. See
also Agustin Barroilhet, Class Actions in Chile (2011) (unpublished thesis, Stanford
Program in International Legal Studies, Stanford University)(on file with author),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1995906.
239. Law No. 19955, Julio 2, 2004, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile) [hereinafter
"CPA"].
240. Barroilhet, supra note 238, at 20 & n.77.
241. Id. at 17.
242. Id. at 20 & n.78.
243. Id. at 22.
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The Chilean statute allows three types of procedural vehicles
for the protection of consumer rights: collective actions filed on
behalf of an identifiable group of consumers linked to a single
defendant by a contract,244 collective actions for the defense of dif-
fuse interests (unidentifiable groups of consumers), and individual
actions.245
Both collective and diffuse interest actions may only be
brought by three entities. First, the National Consumer Service
(SERNAC), 246 a public agency that is part of the Ministry of Econ-
omy, Growth and Reconstruction.24 7 In addition to its litigation
role,248 SERNAC is also charged with implementing consumer pro-
tection policies, leading public campaigns, and overseeing the
activities of other consumer advocacy organizations. As most other
public agencies, SERNAC obtains limited funding from the Chil-
ean central government, making it difficult to accomplish most of
its goals when coupled with the very ambitious agenda with which
it has been charged.24 9
Consumer associations are the second type of entity with
standing to pursue class actions in Chile.250 While private in
nature, CPA requires consumer associations to meet some special
requirements, including having been incorporated for at least six
months prior to bringing any class action. Also, consumer associa-
tions are required to obtain express authorization from their
members to litigate each case.25 1
By imposing such restrictions, the CPA has attempted to limit
the involvement in class actions to organizations that can ade-
quately represent consumers, not only because of their longstand-
ing and stable relationships, and also because these organizations
are subject to external oversight and have been vetted by
SERNAC. The CPA has conversely discouraged the rise of a class
action litigation industry, arguably fueled by opportunistic law-
yers with little or no long-term commitment to the protection of
consumer rights, but rather driven by the prospect of an early set-
tlement that brings a large fee award.
244. See CPA at art. 50.
245. Id.
246. Id. at art. 51(1)(a).
247. Id. at art. 57.
248. See CPA at art. 53 B (CPA empowers SERNAC to continue acting on behalf of
plaintiff even in those cases where the original plaintiff has withdrawn their claim).
249. See Barroilhet, supra note 238, at 34.
250. See CPA at art. 51(1)(b).
251. Id. at arts. 5-9.
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The only way plaintiffs can circumvent the requirement of
acting through a legally established consumer protection associa-
tion or through SERNAC is by reaching the numerosity threshold
of fifty individuals with claims linked by common issues of fact
and law.252 Subject to court approval in the certification stage, a
group of fifty is given standing to act as representative plaintiff on
behalf of the entire class ,253 to appoint common counsel, 254 and pur-
sue the litigation all the way to its conclusion.
In a recent empirical study of class actions in Chile, Bar-
roilhet found that while between 2004 and 2010 SERNAC has
appeared as plaintiff in more cases than each of the other two
authorized entities, its dominance was only by a slim margin.
SERNAC appeared as plaintiff in only 36.8 percent of the cases,
while consumer associations filed 35.1 percent, and the remaining
28.1 percent were brought by groups of more than fifty individu-
als.255 This is contrary to what one might predict given the ample
powers vested in SERNAC with respect to the other two types of
authorized plaintiffs.
CPA also gives judges an expanded role with respect to class
actions. For example, judges may appoint lead counsel as a way to
organize the litigation more efficiently. In addition, the judge can
monitor the lead counsel's work throughout the proceedings and
set her fees after taking into account the amount in dispute, as
well as the economic capacity of the parties.256 Plaintiffs counsel is
also subject to severe disciplinary sanctions should the judge find
a claim to be frivolous.25 7 Unlike most Latin American jurisdic-
tions where contingency fee agreements are expressly forbidden,2 58
Chilean lawyers are authorized to enter into these types of
arrangements with their clients. As a default rule, however, the
judge always retains the power to set or regulate attorney fees.25
Once a class action suit is filed, the judge has to review care-
fully whether the four prerequisites set forth in Article 52 of the
CPA are met. These include the determinations of whether the
plaintiff has standing, whether the alleged harm affects the dif-
fuse or collective interest of a class, whether the complaint
252. Id. at art. 51(1)(c).
253. Barroilhet, supra note 238, at 15.
254. See CPA at art. 54 B.
255. Barroilhet, supra note 238, at 32.
256. Id. at art. 51(7).
257. Id. at art. 50 E.
258. See Gomez, supra note 2, at 296.
259. Barroilhet, supra note 238, at 8.
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includes the factual circumstances that affect the entire class or
group, and whether the potential number of class members is so
numerous that-in terms of a cost-benefit analysis-a class action
proceeding is justified.26 0 In her determination, the judge has to
take into account any evidence submitted by the defendant to
counter the plaintiffs request for certification.2 61
Immediately after class certification is granted, a public
notice shall be given2 62 so others potentially affected by the alleg-
edly harmful event may join the litigation as representative par-
ties.26 3 The public notice also sets the beginning of a thirty-day
opt-out period for those who want to be expressly excluded from
the general effects of any potential decision on the merits.264 Once
the opt-out period is over, any outcome-either via judgment or
settlement-will have res judicata effects not only for the parties,
but erga omnes.265 Other managerial powers given to Chilean
judges in handling consumer class actions are the possibility of
creating sub-classes,26 6 the active encouragement of settlement
throughout the proceedings,2 67 and the proposal and implementa-
tion of a system establishing the payment and disbursement of
award monies among individual plaintiffs.26 8
Even though Chilean class actions are among the most thor-
oughly regulated in Latin America, their limited span to harms
arising exclusively out of consumer contracts, coupled with the
apparent lack of coordination between the provisions of the latter
and the Code of Civil Procedure,269 pose an important barrier to
their use. A more comprehensive, and arguably better, method to
achieve a harmonized regulation of class actions might be one
taken by Mexico in a recent comprehensive statutory reform
passed in August of 2011, discussed in the following subsection.
Mexico
As described earlier, it was in Mexico where amparo suits
260. See CPA at art. 52.
261. Id.
262. All public notices shall contain the specific requirements set forth in CPA
article 54 A. See CPA art. 54A.
263. Id. at art. 53.
264. Id. at art. 53(f).
265. Id. at art. 54 C.
266. Id. at art. 53 A.
267. Id. at art. 53 B.
268. Id. at art. 54 F.
269. See generally Barroilhet, supra note 238 (asserting that CPA is a patchwork
with little or no harmonization with the rest of Chile's procedural laws).
514
2012] LITIGATION ACROSS LATIN AMERICA
were first allowed by the 1841 Yucatin Constitution as a way to
ensure the protection of constitutional rights in a swift manner.2 70
Amparo suits eventually spread around the region and evolved
into a popular, low-cost remedy that enabled judges to offer reme-
dies for violations to fundamental rights mentioned by the consti-
tution but lacking statutory protection.
By the late-twentieth century, collective amparos were the
remedy of choice in many jurisdictions.2 7' The lack of regulation of
procedural remedies against collective or mass harms helped
amparo gain popularity. On the other hand, however, this also
created a great deal of uncertainty and lack of uniformity with
respect to the overuse of amparos, which became synonymous
with shortcuts to quick, albeit not necessarily adequate, judicial
rulings.272
Despite being the motherland of amparo protection, Mexico's
entry into the group of countries with a class action statute has
been somewhat delayed. In 1988, Mexico established an injunctive
relief action of collective nature in its General Statute for Environ-
mental Protection and Ecological Balance.273 Standing to file this
action was vested in the General Prosecutor's Office, and individ-
ual victims were allowed to participate in the proceedings only as
third-party interveners. 7 4 While important, this environmental
action was limited in scope and not suitable for obtaining mone-
tary damages.275 In 1992, a similar action was established by the
Federal Consumer Protection Law.276 In light of the limited scope
of these remedies, many litigants have still preferred to file
amparo suits or, whenever possible, to export their claims for trial
270. See CONSTITUCION DE LA REPIUBLICA DE YUCATAN [Cons. YucatAn], de 1841
(Mex.).
271. See CONST. ARG. (1994); CONST. BOL. (1967); Constitugao Federal [Const.]
(Braz.) (1998); CONST. COSTA RICA (1989); CONST. POL. REPUB. EL SAL. (1983); CONST.
GUAT. (1985); CONST. HOND. (1982); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS
MEXICANOS [Const.] (Mex.) (1917); CONSTITUCiON POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA NIcAR.
[Const.] (1987); CONST. PAN. (1983); CONST. PARA. (1992); CONST. PERU (1993); CONST.
URU. (1984); and CONST. VENEZ. (1999).
272. See Diaz, supra note 61; Santilldn & Galeas, supra note 61.
273. See Ley General de Equilibrio Ecol6gico y Protecei6n al Ambiente [LGEEPA]
[General Environmental Law], as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 4 de
junio de 1992 (Mex.) [hereinafter LGEEPA].
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Ley Federal de Protecei6n al Consumidor [LFPC] [Federal Consumer
Protection Law], as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de diciembre de
1992 (Mex.) [hereinafter LFPC].
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in foreign-mainly U.S.-courts.27 7
Following a regional trend set by Brazil,278 Argentina,27 9 and
Colombia280 in expanding the scope of constitutional provisions to
include group and representative litigation as a special category
worthy of special legislation, on June 10, 2010, the Mexican Con-
gress approved a constitutional amendment to Article 17 of the
Federal Constitution. 281' As amended, Article 17 gave Congress a
special mandate to pass federal legislation-within a year-that
would develop and regulate collective actions.28 2 Moreover, the
amended provision declared collective litigation to be the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts,2 83 thus thwarting any potential
jurisdictional conflict that might arise between state and federal
courts.
On August 30, 2011, a decree regulating class actions (herein-
after, Class Actions Decree or CAD) was published in the Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n ("DO").284 CAD fulfills the constitutional
mandate to regulate collective litigation in Mexico by amending
seven federal statutes: the Federal Civil Procedure Code
(CFPC),285 the Federal Civil Code (CC), 286 the Federal Antitrust
Law (LFCE),28 7 the Federal Consumer Protection Law (LFPC),288
277. See Gomez, supra note 2; Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1982] 1
W.L.R. 730 (CA 1982) (Lord Denning M.R.); and Robertson & Speck, supra note 2.
278. See Constitugao Federal [Const.] (Braz.) (1998).
279. See CONST. ARG. (1994).
280. See CONST. COLOM. (1991).
281. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOs ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS [C.P.
[Constitution], as amended, titulo Primero, Capitulo I, De los Derechos Humanos y
Sus Garantias, art. 17, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 10 de junio de 2010
(Mex.)(Reformada denominaci6n por decreto publicado en el DO el 10 de junio de
2010) adici6n del parrafo tercero se public6 en el DO el 29 de julio de 2010.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See Decreto por el que se reforman y adicionan el C6digo Federal de
Procedimientos Civiles, el C6digo Civil Federal, la Ley Federal de Competencia
Econ6mica, la Ley Federal de Protecci6n al Consumidor, la Ley Organica del Poder
Judicial de la Federaci6n, la Ley General del Equilibrio Ecol6gico y la Protecei6n del
Ambiente, y la Ley de Protecci6n y Defensa al Usuario de Servicios Financieros,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO],30 de agosto de 2011 (Mex.) available at http://
dof.gob.mx/nota-detalle.php?codigo=5206904&fecha=30/08/2011.
285. C6digo Federal de Procedimientos Civiles [CFPC] [Federal Civil Procedure
Code], as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 9 de febrero de 2012 (Mex.).
286. C6digo Civil Federal [CC] [Federal Civil Code], as amended, Diario Oficial de
la Federaci6n [DO], 31 de agosto 1928 (Mex.).
287. Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], as
amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de diciembre de 1992 (Mex.)
(hereinafter LFCE).
288. See LFPC, Ley Federal de Protecci6n al Consumidor [Federal Consumer
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the Enabling Law for the Federal Judiciary (LOPFJ),289 the Gen-
eral Environmental Law (LGEEPA), 290 and the Banking Savings
Protection Law (DUSEF).2 91
As the Mexican reform is largely focused on procedural
aspects, most of the new provisions are intended for inclusion in
the Federal Civil Procedure Code (CFPC), which now incorporates
a new section that contains forty-seven articles, titled "Libro
Quinto: De Las Acciones Colectivas." The remaining six statutes
amended by CAD basically incorporate residual provisions dealing
with standing, federal jurisdiction,29 2 and the expansion of collec-
tive procedures to different categories of claims.2 93
Despite the apparent comprehensiveness of the Mexican
reform, Article 578 of the CFPC expressly limits collective actions
to claims involving consumer relations (including financial and
securities fraud) and environmental harms.294 Similar to the
approach taken by the Colombian 295 and Brazilian 2 96 statutes, arti-
cle 580 of the CFPC distinguishes between diffuse rights, collec-
tive rights, and individual rights of collective incidence
(individually homogeneous rights).29 7 The first two are "indivisi-
ble" and belong to an unidentifiable (diffuse) or identifiable (collec-
tive) category of individuals linked by common questions of fact or
law. 2 98 The latter are "divisible" but affect an identifiable category
of people similarly situated with respect to the law.2 9
This classification has important implications for standing
purposes and for the type of remedy that is allowed in each case.
Protection Law], as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de diciembre de
1992 (Mex.).
289. Ley Organica del Poder Judicial de la Federaci6n [LOPJF] [Enabling Law for
the Federal Judiciary] as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 27 de mayo
de 1995 (Mex.).
290. See LGEEPA, Ley General de Equilibrio Ecol6gico y Protecci6n al Ambiente
[General Environmental Law], as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 4 de
junio de 1992 (Mex.).
291. Ley de Protecci6n y Defensa al Usuario de Servicios Financieros [DUSEF]
[Banking Savings Protection Law], as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO],
18 de enero de 1999 (Mex.).
292. See LFPC at art. 53(V).
293. See LFCE at art. 38; LFPC, supra note 276, at art. 26; and CC, supra note 286,
at art. 1934 his.
294. See CFPC at art. 578.
295. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.](1991).
296. See CONSTITUIQAO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] (Braz.), supra note
34.
297. See CFPC at art. 580.
298. Id.
299. Id.
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Because diffuse rights pertain to an unidentifiable group, their
violation can be asserted by anyone without having to demon-
strate a preexisting legal relationship between agent and victim.3oo
An example of a diffuse action would be one that sought repara-
tions for harm to the environment. Any citizen could bring such an
action. The remedy sought in diffuse right actions is usually of
injunctive nature with no monetary damages.o'
Collective rights' actions, on the other hand, presuppose a
legal or contractual relationship between the alleged wrongdoer
(service provider, product manufacturer, or seller) and an identifi-
able group of victims. Also, any claims need to be brought on
behalf of that group.30 2 With respect to the type of remedies
sought, collective actions may involve both injunctive and mone-
tary relief to benefit the individual members of the group.303
Finally, individual homogeneous actions can also seek injunctive
or monetary relief and be aggregated in light of their common ori-
gin.304 In both collective and individual homogeneous actions,
there is a proposed numerosity threshold of thirty individuals for
the claim to proceed in an aggregate fashion.os
Similar to Chile's CPA,306 CAD gives standing to a limited
number of public entities, including the Office of the Attorney
General 307 and other special federal prosecutors with subject mat-
ter expertise on consumer, securities fraud, antitrust, and envi-
ronmental issues.308 A duly registered and authorized civil
association 3 09 may also bring suit on issues directly related to their
activities as described in their articles of association.1 0 In order to
obtain FJC authorization, civil associations need to exist for at
least one year311 and are required to file an annual report with
300. Id. at art. 581(I).
301. Id.
302. Id. at arts. 581(11), 582.
303. Id.
304. See CFPC at art. 581(111).
305. Id. at art. 588(111).
306. See CPA.
307. See CFPC at art. 585(IV).
308. See Id. at art. 585(I) (including the Federal Prosecutor for Consumer
Protection (FPCP), the Federal Prosecutor for Environmental Protection (FPEP), the
National Commission for the Protection and Defense of Financial services Users and,
and the National Antitrust Commission).
309. Id. at art. 619 (indicating that, because class representation is deemed to be of
public interest, the associations have to register with the Federal Judicial Council
(FJC)).
310. Id. at art. 585(111).
311. Id. at art. 620(11).
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FJC and remain subject to its oversight.3 12 Finally, CAD also gives
standing to a group of at least thirty individuals acting as party
representatives of a class.313 As a way to ensure adequacy of repre-
sentation, CAD subjects civil associations and party representa-
tives to a particularly high standard, including rules on conflicts
of interest,314 sanctions for filing frivolous claims,3 15 and violation
of professional conduct.36
Perhaps the most important deterrent is the prohibition
imposed on plaintiffs to pursue collective litigation as a way to
obtain profit, political benefit, or in any manner inconsistent with
antitrust regulations.1 Should a party representative breach the
standards set forth in Article 586 of CAD, a judge may remove
them, in which case the General Attorney's Office will assume the
representation and continue with the litigation.318
Upon the filing of the complaint, there is a preliminary certifi-
cation phase during which the judge, based on an assessment of
the prerequisites set forth in Articles 587 and 588 of CAD, will
determine whether the litigation should proceed in an aggregate
fashion.3 19 Once the complaint is certified, notice is given to all
potential members of the class so they can request judicial
approval to opt in.320 In addition to its active involvement in the
certification phase, the judge retains ample powers to promote 3 21
and approve settlement,32 2 issue precautionary measures,3 23 direct
the taking of evidence, 324 and set the amount and set the allocation
of attorney and court fees.3 25
Mexico's class action amendment will come into force six
months after its publication in the Official Gazette, which means
that no cases will be filed until January or February of 2012. Only
then will we be able to assess whether the statutes are able to
312. Id. at art. 623.
313. Id. at art. 585(11).
314. Id. at art. 586(11).
315. Id. at art. 586(111).
316. Id. at arts. 586(I), (V).
317. Id. at art. 586(IV).
318. Id. at art. 586.
319. Id. at arts. 587-88, 590.
320. Id. at arts. 591, 593-94.
321. Id. at arts. 595-96.
322. Id.
323. Id. at arts. 611-12.
324. Id. at art. 598.
325. Id. at art. 618.
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fulfill their promise of expanding the protection of individual and
group rights, and effectively facilitating access to justice.
IV. CONCLUSION: A NEW LIGHT SOURCE FOR THE MOTH?
In a previous article, 326 I used the metaphor of migratory birds
to describe the behavior of Latin American parties who would
either travel north, to the United States, or stay south in their
own courts, depending on what incentives were available to
them. 327 Similarly, an oft-cited phrase by an English judge in a
1982 judicial decision 328 equated foreign plaintiffs to "moths" being
attracted to the "light" of the United States courts.3 29
Until recently, challenges faced by Latin American disputants
in their home forums, coupled with the incentives offered by the
legal system of the United States, have given credibility to these
colorful metaphors. An emerging trend in Latin America, how-
ever, has the potential to help tilt the balance in the other direc-
tion. As described in this article, the tendency in Latin America
seems to be in favor of expanding the procedural protection of
individual and collective rights through the establishment of dif-
ferent forms of collective litigation, including class actions.
This movement, albeit timid, shows that the policy debate
about class actions and other forms of group litigation has reached
the necessary maturity level for the legal machinery to react and
provide local protection against collective harms. The new Latin
American class action statutes and related legislation are a step in
the right direction. Nonetheless, some of these laws have left out a
number of key aspects including representation issues, certifica-
tion requirements, opt-in and opt-out procedures, procedural safe-
guards, punitive and catastrophic damages, and litigation finance.
Some of these deficiencies may be overcome with the help of
creative judges and counsel in the short term, or eventually by
additional legislation geared to fine-tune the foundations set forth
by the current statutory framework. There is also a dire need for
more empirical research on the use of class actions and other
mechanisms in Latin America. Only by looking at how the law
operates on the ground will one be able to assess whether the new
326. See G6mez, supra note 2.
327. Id. at 300.
328. Smith Kline & French Laboratories, Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 2 All E.R. 72, 74, 1
W.L.R. 730 (C.A. 1982) (Lord Denning M.R.).
329. Id. ("As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United
States. If he can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune.").
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framework has indeed contributed to shift the incentives and per-
suaded Latin American litigants to stay "south" in their own
courts, or to be attracted by these new sources of light.
Meanwhile, the writ of amparo and other similar devices
geared to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief will continue to
serve as palliative until the official laws catch up with the needs of
those affected with large-scale accidents and other harms, includ-
ing those arising out of defective products and faulty services.

